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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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ECA MEETING STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL GROUPS

London WEST AFRICA in English 16 May 83 p 1155

[Editorial: "Omens for ECOWAS"]

[Text]

ONE OF THE features of the Silver Jubilee celebrations of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (reported in last week's *West Africa*) was the stress placed at the event on the continuing importance of regional groupings. The symbolic entry of a new member (Rwanda) into the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) was one sign of this, and although hopes were placed on this, and other groupings such as the embryo Central African Economic Community, the main success story to date in this sector to which all referred, is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Those trying to plan Africa's future, looking at the bleak auguries for what could happen in the next 25 years see the kind of regional co-operation that ECOWAS symbolises as the only way forward, above all when it comes to industrialisation, which still, in spite of the necessary reassertion of agricultural priorities, represents the hope for the future. "The conclusion is inescapable that no industrial take-off will be possible unless the envisaged degree of regional and sub-regional economic co-operation is achieved", says *ECA and Africa's Development: 1983-2000*, a study by the ECA Secretariat.

It cannot honestly be said that ECOWAS has any remarkable achievements yet to its credit. Its main virtue is to exist at all, in the face of the complex tissue of relations that characterise the 16 states of the West African sub-region. It is also ahead of any other groupings elsewhere in Africa, and in West Africa serves not only as an umbrella for all the other groupings of the region (CEAO, Mano River Union, Entente Council, Senegal and Gambia River Organisations, *et al*) but aspires to be much more than all of them, a genuinely regional organisation that tackles all the main divergences and contradictions in the region.

In our report on the Fifth Summit held in Cotonou on ECOWAS' seventh anniversary last year (*West Africa*, June 7, 1982) we described the organisation as "trembling on the brink". Now, a year later, it still seems as if

progress has been slow, and the organisation is still only tentatively coming to grips with the admittedly enormous problems which confront it. A report of the results of the Council of Ministers' meeting, held in Conakry, on May 7 to 9 (see Dateline Africa, page 1208) gives some clues as to the continuing issues before ECOWAS, and areas that may feature in the heads of state meeting, due to take place in the Guinea capital from May 27 to 29. To pinpoint two questions — the ministers still seem understandably preoccupied with the difficulty of application of ECOWAS decisions in member states (something which saps, for example, the effectiveness of the progressive application of trade liberalisation), and the vexed issue of the Protocol on the Free Movement of People.

The year since Cotonou has, indeed, been characterised by problems arising from this, above all the measures taken by Nigeria against illegal aliens, many of whom had undoubtedly originally entered under the provisions for entry without visa for 90 days provision of the Protocol, the only one to be applied so far. It was stressed at the time that the measure was quite within ECOWAS rules, but fears were expressed that the manner of carrying it out might place a strain on the climate of confidence so necessary in a young organisation like this one. As it is, all the countries concerned have shown a desire not to make waves. There have, after all, been other such actions (eg, Sierra Leone's expulsion of Foulah's to Guinea in December) and Ghana, for compelling economic and perhaps security reasons, closed its border, in violation of ECOWAS rules, from September 1982 to March 1983.

The heads of state agreed last year on a committee of wise men to examine fundamental issues related to the future of ECOWAS. One of the questions raised last year was the role that should be played by smaller groupings within the larger. This question applied above all to the CEAO (a six-nation francophone grouping) which has sometimes been seen as a brake on the interest of the political will and interest of the states concerned in relation to the larger grouping. Now, the CEAO states are in turn likely to use the forthcoming summit to treat the commitment of Nigeria to ECOWAS in the wake of the expulsions. In view of the importance of the grouping, it is to be hoped that the will of neither will be found wanting.

The serious state of the economies of all the countries of the West African region is enough to give serious grounds for collective concern. Last year Nigerian austerity had only just begun, and no one knew if it was going to last. Now, with the deepening of the recession and the oil glut, it looks much more of a long-term feature. Political energies in Nigeria have all been concentrated on the forthcoming election, or else the economic frustrations could easily have found another political outlet. If in Ghana it was not surprising that, in the wake of a swingeing "make or break" budget, some political turbulence would continue, the recent school-teachers' strike in

Ivory Coast showed that stability "Houphouët-style" could crack at the seams more easily than had been imagined, and that chill economic winds often bring political unrest in the air. There have been too many warnings lately that old models may be getting worn out, and old nostras may no longer apply. Thus, in Conakry, ECOWAS leaders could, in spite of the difficulties of the past year, huddle closer together. But if ECOWAS remains a heads-of-state club, unable to demonstrate what it can do for the people, it will still be condemned to emptiness.

CSO: 3400/1468

CAMEROON

ECONOMY MOVES TOWARD SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN SUGAR, RICE

Dakar AFRICA in French No 150, Apr 83 p 107

[Article: "Sugar: Self-sufficiency"]

[Text] In Cameroon, agriculture is considered to be the basis for economic development, and self-sufficiency in terms of foodstuffs is one of the priorities of the government. It is within this framework that the sugar industry has developed itself, with SOSUCAM [Sugar Company of Cameroon] and CAMSUCO [Cameroon Sugar Company].

The first factory, SOSUCAM, was established in 1965. The starting production of 1,600 tons rapidly multiplied. Its 7,000 hectares of cultivated land currently produce between 27,000 and 30,000 tons of sugar, providing jobs for 2,500 wage earners. The company has a capital of 2 billion francs CFA; its major shareholders are the Management and Development Company for Agricultural Foodstuff Industries [SOMDIAA], of the Grands Moulins group in Paris, and the state of Cameroon. SOSUCAM has invested more than 21 billion francs CFA. The next investment program in the amount of 1.9 billion francs CFA, to be completed over a 2 year period, will be used to renew and modernize equipment, without increasing the production capacity. These investments will be financed in part by local banks, and in part by the IFC.

The second factory, CAMSUCO, took off in 1977. With a capital of more than 2 billion francs CFA, the major part of which was held by the state of Cameroon and by parastatal organizations -- SNI [National Investment Company] (64 percent) --, and investments of 23 billion francs CFA (purchase of land, equipment, machines), this unit has the capability of producing 80,000 tons of sugar per year. Its current production is well below that level (33,700 tons in 1981/82); the expected production for the 1982/83 accounting period is 40,000 tons, and 48,000 tons for 1983/84. The production will be tied directly to the country's needs. Three thousand five hundred jobs have already been created.

Not Competitive

For a short time now these two factories have been able to meet local consumption needs. Imports have virtually come to a complete stop, partly ending the problems of marketing the sugar. As a matter of fact, the cost price of Cameroon sugar, a standardized product, is 185 francs CFA per kilogram, and is

sold at 210 francs CFA per kilogram for granulated sugar and 220 francs CFA per kilogram for cube sugar; it is absolutely not in any position to compete with imported sugars because today the world market price is at its lowest.

As sugar is a basic need product, it is important for Cameroon to be independent, to be able to adapt its production to the evolution of its needs; but for now, exports are not being considered because of the trade outlook.

However, those in charge of that sector view the future with a certain optimism. As eating habits change and the economy develops (breweries, candy factories...), an increase in the national consumption of sugar is possible.

Rice-growing: Encouraging Results

An interesting experiment has been taking place since 1972 in the northern part of the country. In order to limit imports, Cameroon established in a second development plan for rice-growing in the region of Yagoua the objective of a yearly production of 20,000 tons of paddy by 1985. The project is limited to the conversion of an area of 5,000 hectares whose management was entrusted to the Company for Development and Modernization of Rice-growing in Yagoua [SEMRY].

Why that region? The ecological and topographical conditions were suitable for it; the farmers had already been exposed to this cultivation (since 1955); furthermore, it was important to maintain a maximum number of farmers (12,000 families) locally, on small plots of land of 50 ares, by adding to the family income earned through traditional dry farming (millet, tobacco).

Irrigation through pumping from the Logone river, the use of fertilizers, and seed selection have made it possible to exceed expectations. In 1977, in view of the results, the state of Cameroon, the World Bank, the CCCE [Central Fund for Economic Cooperation], and the FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund] decided to extend the experiment. The region of Maga was set aside, but the conversion of this second area was very different: the construction of a dike to allow the irrigation within an area of 7,000 hectares. Population transfers from 50 to 60 kilometers were necessary.

Other SEMRY projects are in progress in the region of Kousseri.

SEMRY puts small developed plots of land (50 ares) called stakes, at the disposal of the farmers; it takes care of the heavy plowing, provides water, fertilizers and seedlings, and provides the necessary training and technical assistance. The farmers plant, weed, harvest, but will keep only 10 percent of their production for themselves; the remainder is bought by SEMRY at a price set by the government, from which a fee is deducted in exchange for services rendered. The proceeds of its sales ensure sufficient daily returns (approximately 1,000 francs CFA net).

Expectations for 1982/83 are for a harvest of 65,000 tons of paddy which, after processing, will produce approximately 45,000 tons of processed product, providing a livelihood for 20,000 rice growers (or a population of 100,000 individuals) in addition to the 3,000 to 4,000 employees of SEMRY. Paddy is bought

at 62 francs CFA per kilogram minus fees; processed rice should be sold at 135 francs CFA per kilogram. By 1985, production should reach 90,000 tons of paddy for 12,000 hectares of rice fields, of which 8,000 hectares are double cropped.

Responsible Farmers

The results of this experiment are encouraging; an agricultural research service makes it possible to improve seeds regularly and to find appropriate varieties. This makes it possible to obtain yields among the highest in the world, with 5 tons per hectare, which have exceeded by 60 percent the objectives set by the project.

The people involved in the project feel responsible for their crops and do not take on the attitude of subsidized farmers.

All of this encourages investments, which already exceed 25 billion francs CFA; 3.7 billion francs CFA are expected for the accounting period 1982/83, 5 billion for 1983/84, with Cameroon's share being 35 percent.

The goal of this operation is obviously to ensure the long term self-sufficiency of the country in terms of rice, but at the same time, the authorities want regional development and are already turning toward other interesting sectors: fishing (the water reservoir at Moga is already abounding in fish), sheep raising, pig raising...; attempts at reforestation are also under way.

However, SEMRY is running into serious problems; current production levels allow it to meet only 70 percent of local needs, and yet it encounters difficulties in selling its stock. First obstacle: the high cost price of its product, 25 percent higher than the world market price (high pumping costs, heavy depreciation). Second obstacle: the organization of the transportation of the rice to the center and the southern part of the country. There is a great deal to be done at the marketing level. A significant part of the production was sold to Chad, Nigeria; the current trade outlook is no longer very favorable.

Excessive Imports

Furthermore, imported rice is flooding the Cameroon market. It is said that between 220,000 and 250,000 tons of rice were imported last year (part of which was only in transit). This rice, which comes from India and Pakistan and which is often of medium quality, is marketed at a very low price. A brake imposed on the issuing of import licences, tougher entry control, credit restrictions to importers of this commodity (several local banks loaned significant sums of money to those businessmen and are having serious difficulties in collecting them), customs duties whether the product remains in Cameroon or is only in transit, all these measures should decelerate this traffic and stabilize the rice market in the months to come.

8463

CSO: 3419/877

STUDENTS SPEARHEAD OPPOSITION TO PNDC

London WEST AFRICA in English 16 May 83 pp 1157, 1158

[Article by Nii K. Bentsi-Enchill]

[Text] OPPOSITION to the PNDC has recently found a spearhead in the student leadership and sections of the student body. Along with the Association of Recognised Professional Bodies (and the Bar Association in particular), they have demanded that the PNDC must hand over to a "national government". The professionals have given a one-month deadline, after which the "national government" would take office for a minimum of four years "to enable Ghanaians to evolve the type of government they want".

However, workers' unions and defence committees have immediately blunted the spearhead. Student demonstrations in Kumasi and Accra against the government have only succeeded in having the universities closed in the two cities (see p. 1209). Obuasi mineworkers came to the Science and Technology campus to denounce the anti-government stand of the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) congress. Workers from Accra and Tema joined Legon campus workers also to oppose students and, in effect, caused the university to close down. The bare fact is that while workers objected to certain aspects of the 1983 Budget, they also reject categorically any attempt by students and the professionals to enlist their support against the government.

The Teachers and Educational Workers' Union said students would understand the national crisis better if they went home instead of sitting on campus where they are fed three times a day with the nation's resources. This comment underlines the perceived contrast between the annual C50m. running costs of the university at

Legon, and what workers see as the selfish attitude of students at this time of national crisis. Furthermore, workers feel students are being used by "reactionary elements to come out in open defiance of the genuine interest of the working people and the nation at large".

Certainly, NUGS has been taking a bold stance. The *Pioneer* of April 20 urged NUGS to dispel the impression that it was being manipulated against the government by adopting a less aggressive posture. The editorial noted phrases in recent NUGS press statements such as: "... we have spoken and let all those who matter note that ..."; "the NUGS wishes to state emphatically to the PNDC government that we shall resist fiercely and fearlessly ...".

Already in January, Legon was closed a few days before schedule following a clash between some workers and students. The confrontations of early this month were no surprise therefore. Some Legon students marched to the offices of the *People's Daily Graphic* and then to the New Times Corporation, issuing threats and injuring the editor of the *Weekly Spectator* and his assistant, according to GBC Radio. It said workers forced the students to scatter, with some sustaining injuries.

In Kumasi, there were injuries on both sides, and five vehicles were reportedly burnt on the campus. In Cape Coast, some students protested against the closure of the Kumasi campus, and according to GBC reports, ransacked the offices of the Ghana News Agency, the Ministry of Information, the *People's Daily Graphic*, and the *Ghanaian Times* which they said had misinformed the public over the Kumasi inci-

dents.

At the time of going to press, there had been no comment from the PNDC on the declared intention of workers to occupy Legon Halls of residence for three years. It is, in fact, only one aspect of the present relationship between the government and the urban working classes in particular.

"It is true that there was not enough education about the seriousness of the economic crisis before the budget — hence, the shocked reaction of most people," declared the National Defence Committee a little ingenuously. Early post-budget statements by the TUC as well as workers in Accra and Tema spoke of the feeling that the PNDC had recently been "wooing" sections of society opposed to workers' interests. They also felt that "the exploiters" were not having to sacrifice as much as ordinary people, and the PNDC should announce and implement those measures supposed to shift the burden from workers' backs. In this context came the announcement by the NDC of practical steps that defence committees should take to establish People's Shops and ensure equitable commodity distribution, to take full responsibility for implementing rent controls, and prepare the vehicle pooling scheme.

Such constructive mobilisation could have been done months ago had the political will been there. Now, there are problems. People are hungry, and less than totally convinced about precisely where the commitment of the national leadership lies. Obstructive attitudes in some ministries have flourished, and the commercial houses have been wary of the development of People's Shops. Similarly, certain managers and staff of the Ghana National Trading Company Corporation, as well as the local and transnational firms involved in distribution, will see their access to the profits of commodity speculation threatened. But for the government, it need not be a case of "too little, too late".

There are several elements of paralysis and crisis in Ghana today. No secret has been made of the critical food situation, and even after emergency imports start arriving to provide marginal relief, the lean period stretches to September. The food situation is compounded by the acute shortage of tyres in the transport sector, and the post-budget fuel prices with their own impact on prices. With these few elements in mind, the way the budget was dropped like a bomb was almost foolhardy.

The hardships being endured by people in Ghana can be a political problem for the government precisely because the opposition can use this "golden opportunity". Since the end of June last year an issue to mobilise middle-class opinion against the government has been the murders of a retired soldier and three High Court judges. The form it now takes is the demand by students and professionals that the report of the Special Investigation Board on the murders be published immediately. The 1983 budget appeared to present an opportunity to use legitimate grievances of workers against aspects of the budget to oppose the government in general. The workers have frustrated these "budget-politicians".

What remains immediately is the practice of confrontation which would encourage the militarisation of the government. This can only prosper if the links between the PNDC and organised labour and defence committees, not to mention progressive organisations, remain ambiguous. One can say that from last June, to October 28, to November 23, to the Nigerian expulsion order in mid-January, to the February coup plot, to this April budget, the PNDC has been faced with crisis after crisis. The important background for the rest of this year is the economic situation with food as the enduring concern of immediacy. Most importantly, however, is the type of politics that the PNDC practises, for this will determine how it fares.

HOUPHOUET'S CRITIC, LAURENT GBAGBO INTERVIEWED

London WEST AFRICA in English 16 May 83 pp 1164-1165

[Text] Q. Over the past year or so, you have become, in President Houphouët-Boigny's eyes, "public enemy number one", accused of being responsible for protest and unrest in both student and teacher circles.

A. Since my student days I have been against the Houphouët-Boigny regime. Firstly, I am opposed in principle to the one-party state, because it leads to the dictatorship of one individual who is the head of a party which governs a country. When there is no countervailing power in a country, basic liberties are constantly threatened.

Secondly, I am against the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI) because of its political orientation. Let's not forget that historically this party did not really want to accept independence. De Gaulle practically had to stuff it down the PDCI's throat. The party's policies have since been characterised by the constant abandoning of numerous aspects of Ivorian national sovereignty. For example, Ivory Coast cannot be said to have its own defence policy; everything depends on France and the French troops stationed in our country. Another point of disagreement I have with the PDCI is its economic orientation. Basically, this party has continued the economic policies inherited from the colonial era. This is particularly the case in agriculture; the government's efforts and money have been channelled almost exclusively into the promotion of export crops like cocoa, coffee and sugar. Food crops have been virtually ignored. The reason for this is that the PDCI regime is able, through the *Caisse de Stabilisation*, to extort about 75 per cent of the cost of tropical export produce from the peasantry. Now that the price of cocoa and coffee

is low, Ivory Coast must spend more and more of its precious hard currency on import basic foodstuffs.

Q. Last February you were at the centre of the problems at the University of Abidjan and now you are accused of instigating, from Paris, the teachers' strike. From a social and political viewpoint what is behind these movements?

A. Concerning government accusations over my role in the student and teacher protest, let's not forget that President Houphouët-Boigny has never really come up against any credible opposition. Until now, all opposition figures have accepted government posts, money or honours in exchange for integrating themselves into the regime. In some cases, ambitious young Ivorians used their pseudo-opposition as a means of rapidly assuring their promotion in PDCI ranks. Thus the Head of State, in his paternalistic way, considers opposition as a means people use to assure personal advancement.

In my case, however, the President has for the first time come up against someone who refuses to dance to his tune. I have always refused to compromise myself with the regime, in spite of the offers which have been made to me. The President does not understand this attitude and he says "I understand that Gbagbo wanted to protest at 20 years old, but at 38 it is not possible".

The student and teacher movements of the past year have a double aspect: they are both political and corporative. In February 1982, the students and teachers complained about the lack of democracy and freedom of speech. The tail, I was supposed to give at the university was a symbol of the desire to have greater

freedom of discussion. The government sent the police to break up the meeting only one hour before it was scheduled to begin. Thus, this movement was essentially political.

In 1983, the problem is on the surface more corporative, revolving around the decision to put an end to the free housing until now granted the teachers. Who has the right to free housing in Ivory Coast today? Firstly, the French *coopérants*. Secondly, the army officers, police, gendarmes, préfets, judges, senior civil servants and ministers. Out of the total government expenditure on housing, only 14.6 per cent is spent on teachers' housing, a mere drop in the ocean. This clearly shows that it was not to save money that the government decision was taken. If the government really wanted to cut down on housing expenditures it would have put an end to free housing for the *coopérants*. Obviously, for political reasons, it is impossible for Houphouët to do such a thing. Likewise, reducing the advantages of those in uniform could provoke trouble that the regime wants to avoid at all costs. If the President is seeking to reduce the perks of teachers, it is for political reasons. In 1970, he sought to integrate the university and secondary school teachers' unions into the PDCI, but he failed. In 1980, he again attempted to bring the unions under the PDCI wing. But his second try was hardly more successful.

These unions were among the few organisations which were independent of PDCI tutorship, a state of affairs which Houphouët could not easily accept. And so his aim was to crush them. In 1982, the university teachers' union was dissolved. Now it has been the turn of the secondary school teachers' union.

Q. Paradoxically, President Houphouët-Boigny accuses you of being at the same time a tribal agitator, representing Beté protest against Baoulé domination, and an internationalist, receiving support from foreign powers in an attempt to destabilise his regime.

A. Concerning domestic politics, it is only recently that the regime has attempted to pin the tribalist tag on me. This is a sure sign that the President is losing his calm and resorting to low tactics in the effort to discredit me. Personally, I reject these very base accusations. Those who know me in Ivory Coast are aware that I am not a Beté standard-bearer. It is to Ivory Coast's honour that since the first elections

in 1945, no party has been exclusively tribal in nature. These accusations are, in fact, just a cheap attempt to distract attention from the country's real problems.

The charge that I am also a foreign agitator, or, as the government puts it, "an agent of Gaddafi", is also a ploy to avoid the problem of confronting politically those who seek to promote democratic freedom in Ivory Coast. Every time there is trouble in Ivory Coast the President claims that foreigners are instigating it. What he is basically saying by this is that Ivoirians are incapable by themselves of opposing his anti-national policies. The recent military coups in Liberia, Ghana and Upper Volta also gave him nightmares and he believes that foreign powers are actively seeking his own downfall. Moreover, he tries to give the impression that political conflicts in Ivory Coast are part of the East-West struggle, thereby assuring himself that the West is backing his regime. Few Ivoirians take this very seriously. Even abroad it has lost its credibility.

Q. President Houphouët-Boigny has been able since independence to assure political stability in Ivory Coast by utilising the country's wealth to buy off or co-opt the élite. Today, however, the teachers' strike seems to demonstrate that he no longer has the means to do so and that something has changed in the mentality of young Ivoirians.

A. One of the President's principal skills has been the utilisation of funds extorted from the peasants through the *Caisse de Stabilisation* to corrupt the élite. The President's theme has been: "Get rich and let me take care of politics". This policy was designed to channel Ivoirian energies into areas other than politics. As long as the Ivoirian economy was growing, the President had the resources to drown potential protest in a flood of CFA francs. Salaries for government officials were among the highest in all Africa. The para-statal sector in particular was used to create positions for his cronies.

All this got Ivory Coast into a deep financial hole which required it to come under the IMF's heel. Now, with the state exchequer virtually empty, the President no longer has the means to pull the wool over Ivoirian eyes.

*Q. One of the principal subjects of discontent among young educated Ivoirians is the pervasive influence of foreigners, especially French *coopérants*, in all key govern-*

ment institutions. Why has President Houphouët-Boigny slowed down the Ivorianisation process?

A. It is an open secret that the President does not have confidence in Ivorians. At present, for example, 23 years after independence his Cabinet Director, the Government Secretary-General, and his own personal secretary are all French. Each Minister has one or two French advisers who are the real power behind the throne. The Ministry of Planning and Finance is particularly infested with French *coopérants*. The armed forces, naturally, are full of French officers, as are the security forces and the intelligence network.

The President has always believed that the only veritable model of development comes from abroad. For Ivory Coast to copy such a model, a massive presence of foreigners in high positions was necessary. The President cannot conceive of alternative development strategies. Even when young Ivorians are named to important posts, their functions are usually symbolic, as they are coupled with a French *coopérant*. Of course, this practice discourages them. The President considers the French *coopérants* to be more dependent on him than Ivorians would be, and so he assures his domination by keeping young Ivorians as far as possible from the centres of decisions.

Q. It is said that the voluntary retirement of President Senghor in 1981 and President Ahidjo in 1982 has increased pressure on President Houphouët-Boigny to step down from power.

A. I believe that the President cannot conceive of leaving office. He doesn't want to give up the presidency and he finds it difficult to imagine that the Ivory Coast could have another President while he is still alive.

It is only strong domestic and international pressure which can force him out of office. But by dangling the succession issue in front of the PDCI barons, he has managed to neutralise them through an interminable struggle between rival clans. This is his old divide-and-rule tactic, but unfortunately it is likely to cost Ivory Coast dearly in years to come.

MACHEL-BOTHA TALKS SAID AIMED AT REDUCING TENSION

Paris LE MONDE in French 11 May 83 p 3

[Article by Jean-Pierre Langellier]

[Text] Maputo--"Struggle, struggle, talk, talk." Have Mozambique's leaders been pondering that old Vietnamese proverb? At the same time that it is declaring total war on the "armed bandits" in the Mozambican National Resistance (RNM), Samora Machel's regime is increasing its dialogue with their South African sponsors.

Last Thursday (5 May), Mozambicans and South Africans met at the frontier post of Komatipoort (LE MONDE, 8-9 May). On one side was Jacinto Veloso, Maputo's minister of security and member of the FRELIMO Politburo, and on the other was "Pik" Botha, head of Pretoria's diplomatic service. The two men and their delegations had met earlier at the same spot on 17 December 1982. According to Pretoria, three meetings had also taken place in 1980 and 1981, but only the last one--on 11 December 1981--was made public.

What "problems of mutual interest" were discussed in Komatipoort? Probably discussed were ways of improving "neighborly relations." Border incidents periodically bring the two countries into conflict. Mozambique denounces "troop concentrations" and "infiltration by saboteurs." The captain of a South African trawler stopped in Mozambican waters has just been given a heavy fine. A "secret agent" arrested at the border declared last week on Maputo television that his mission had been to assassinate Machel. According to "Pik" Botha, the man is actually only a fraud with a criminal past.

The agenda for the talks in Komatipoort probably also included the various aspects of economic interdependence: the delimitation of fishing zones, the management of port and railway traffic, and the use of electricity from Cabora Bassa Dam. But those were not the important topics. The negotiations could be summed up briefly in six initials: RNM-ANC. On the one hand, there is the Mozambican rebellion, and on the other, there is the African National Congress: the movement, banned in South Africa, which heads the struggle against the regime of apartheid.

The stakes are clear: Pretoria "sponsors" the RNM and provides it with crucial logistic support, while Maputo welcomes and aids the opponents of "pale power."

Each capital is doing its best to obtain neutrality toward itself from the other. How far can such a "modus vivendi" go? That sums up the whole issue. Machel has justified dialogue with the enemy by the need to "explore all possible avenues to peace," the will to "reduce regional tension," and the concern "to isolate and neutralize" Pretoria.

Maputo the Petitioner

The argument would be more convincing--and negotiation no doubt easier--if the stakes were less unequal. Beyond the glaring military imbalance, Mozambique has much less to offer its powerful neighbor than the other way around. It is more the petitioner than South Africa is. Pretoria wants to see the ANC neutralized in Mozambique and to be guaranteed that Mozambique will provide neither a "jump-off point" nor a "sanctuary" for the nationalist fighters.

But South Africa knows full well that like Zimbabwe, Mozambique does not shelter any military training camps for the ANC. If the opposite were true, it would long ago have used that fact as a "casus belli."

Between 5 and 50 South African refugees arrive in Mozambique in a given month. Most of them are now natives of Natal. They come most often by air from Lesotho. More rarely, they cross the border from Swaziland. They are taken in either by the ANC with the help of the Mozambican Government or by the UNHCR (UN Office of High Commissioner for Refugees).

Fewer than 150 refugees are registered with the UNHCR, which is preparing a rural development project on their behalf. The ANC's members and sympathizers, on the other hand, do not stay in Mozambique. They simply pass through on their way to Zambia or--especially--Angola and Tanzania, where they will be able to receive military training.

The Maputo government has given land to the ANC in the northern part of the country near Nampula. SIDA [Swedish International Development Authority] is ready to finance the construction on that land of an economically viable farm like the one operating successfully in Tanzania. It is probable that the Mozambicans will help hasten the completion of that project, since it would then be possible to make the ANC's members "settle down" far from the South African border. Pretoria cannot hope to obtain more from its neighbor, and those fleeing apartheid will always find temporary asylum in Mozambique.

Is it possible that the "connection" established by Pretoria between the RNM's activities and those of the ANC is no more than a convenient pretext? Indres Naidoo, the ANC's deputy representative in Maputo, thinks so. He says: "Even if we all left the country, the South Africans would continue to destabilize this country." He realizes that Machel is forced to deal with the devil--"Mozambique must survive," he adds--but he says he is convinced that no harm will come to the ANC because of it.

A priori, one can also see no reason why Pretoria would "drop" the RNM. The RNM undoubtedly does not appreciate the publicity surrounding the meetings in Komatipoort. Is it possible that it might bear the brunt of a "modus vivendi"

between the two neighbors? That is doubtful, at least in the immediate future. After all, Pretoria can only be happy with the regional situation. The South Africans are using the RNM as a sword held at Mozambique's back. Rebellion is unable to succeed in the field? It doesn't matter! Overthrowing the Mozambican regime is not the objective.

Pending proof to the contrary, it can be said that the objectives in Pretoria's strategy have not changed: it wants to keep its neighbors in the vassalage that arose from geography and is reinforced by the sluggishness of a colonialist past; demonstrate to the world the failure of a multiracial society, especially under socialist regimes (Zimbabwe and Mozambique); and prevent the emergence of a regional subunit aspiring to reduce its dependence on the South African giant. By measuring out the correct dose of aid to the RNM, Pretoria can simultaneously show its good will at the least cost, allow the Mozambican regime to "breathe" a little, and, in exchange, extract a few concessions from that regime while remaining in control of the game.

All of this means that Maputo is careful to avoid provocation. It is true that in December, there was that Mozambican threat to "take exceptional steps"--the implication being that Cuban troops would be called in--if the regime felt itself to be in mortal danger. "Pik" Botha reacted immediately by saying that his country would not tolerate such a possibility. And in fact, the "Angolization" of Mozambique would give South Africa its dreamed-of opportunity to intervene as it pleased. Nothing further came of the threat, and no one in Maputo believes that a Cuban contingent is going to arrive unless, of course, the military situation for FRELIMO becomes desperate.

The "economic interdependence" between the two neighbors remains dominant, although it is clearly weighted in Pretoria's favor. South Africa is still Mozambique's main supplier. About 40,000 Mozambicans work in the Transvaal mines, and there are also several thousand illegal farmworkers. Pretoria is continuing to pay 60 percent of the miners' wages to Mozambique in gold. Through the wages and transit duties it pays, South Africa provides its neighbor with 40 percent of the latter's foreign exchange resources. Machel would gladly welcome South African investors in his country.

In any case, bilateral relations seem to rest on sounder foundations than they did in the past. For example, General Malan, South Africa's minister of defense, admitted in February that his country might help the RNM sometime in the future. That semiconfession was certainly made "after the event" and reluctantly, but after years of flat denials, it nevertheless marked a start toward frankness that Maputo was able to appreciate at its true value.

11798

CSO: 3419/915

OPEC LOAN FOR MANANTALI DAM FINANCING

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 29 Apr 83 p 2

[Article: "OMVS: More Than 3 Billion CFA Francs from OPEC Loan for Manantali Dam"]

[Text] The OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] fund for international development has granted a loan to Senegal for 3,348,000,000 CFA francs to finance the construction of the Manantali hydroelectric dam project. The agreement covering the loan was signed on 15 April in Vienna, Austria.

In addition to the signature of the loan agreement, an additional agreement was signed bringing the government of Senegal into the Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS). In effect the development of the Senegal River is conceived of a single program, with the three countries which make up the organization (Mauritania, Mali, and Senegal) acting together to apply this principle.

It should be explained that this loan of OPEC funds to the Republic of Senegal is one of three allocations from a larger total amount which the fund will grant to the OMVS for the Manantali Dam. In this context loans to Mauritania and Mali have already been approved by the council of governors of the fund and should be signed in the near future.

The Manantali project, which is co-financed by the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, the African Development Bank, the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development, the Saudi Development Fund, and the Islamic Development Bank, among other institutions, is an example of economic cooperation between developing countries which are pooling their resources.

We may recall that this loan which has been granted to Senegal has an interest rate of 3 percent and is repayable over a period of 15 years, with 5 years of deferred payment.

After the completion of the Manantali hydroelectric dam, a reservoir of water amounting to 10 cubic kilometers will be held behind the dam, making it possible to regularize the flow of the river throughout the

year. This flow should amount to 300 cubic meters per second at the town of Bakel. This will permit the irrigation of 255,000 hectares of land initially. Later on, 800 gigawatts of hydroelectric power per hour will be produced annually.

The dam will be 70 meters high, 1,485 meters long, and will have five water intakes in its structure, two spillways, and a damping basin.

The people who live the vicinity of the dam, estimated at totaling more than 100,000 people at present, will be resettled in modern houses alongside land developed for agriculture.

The project also provides for the construction of roads and railroads. There will also be established in the vicinity of the dam schools for professional training, facilities for technical assistance, consulting services, and social and public health offices. The public health unit will include a clinic for the treatment of onchocercosis [river blindness].

In addition to Arab countries, the other countries and organizations which will participate in financing the construction of the Manatali Dam are: the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, the European Development Fund, the African Development Bank, the American Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

5170

CSO: 3419/891

EEC COMMISSIONER SIGNS WELL FINANCING AGREEMENT

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 3 May 83 pp 1, 5

[Article by M. M.: "EEC to Finance Drilling 21 Wells"]

[Text] The use of new methods to establish a new system which will make development aid more effective is a crying need, according to Edgar Pisani, commissioner for development in the European Economic Community [EEC], in speaking to the press after his meeting with the minister of plan and cooperation.

Pisani also expressed pleasure over the closeness of the cooperative relations between the community and Senegal, which was properly considered one of its oldest associates.

Furthermore, Pisani signed a financial agreement with Sheikh Hamidou Kane, amounting to 773 million CFA francs, earmarked for the drilling of 21 wells and related facilities in the Diourbel, Louga, and Thies regions.

A program for the reconstruction of wells presently not operating was also accepted by the EEC, which decided to direct its activity progressively toward the completion of small projects which can be harmoniously integrated within the framework of community development operations.

Sheikh Hamidou Kane, minister of plan and cooperation, and Edgar Pisani, commissioner of the European Economic Communities, yesterday [2 May] signed a financial agreement worth 773 million CFA francs. This agreement covers the drilling of 21 reinforced wells [forages avec contre-puits] in the Diourbel, Louga, and Thies regions. The assistance is provided by the European Development Fund [EDF]. Technical study of bids for construction of the project is already under way. The actual work should begin shortly.

In the view of the EEC commissioner this is a considerable effort undertaken by the community in West Africa. According to Edgar Pisani, this involves orienting its current efforts toward the completion of small projects which can be harmoniously integrated within the framework of community development activity. Thus, these wells, which will be able to provide some 20 cubic meters of water per hour, will exceed human consumption needs for water and will make possible a limited amount of irrigation activity.

He added: "Furthermore, we have been informed that some existing wells are not producing as much water as they should, and we have accepted the principle of rebuilding them."

In general we have already noted a desire to reorient cooperation between the countries of the community and the ACP [African, Caribbean, and Pacific] countries. The community had made public a list of priorities to be submitted to these cooperating countries. Among other things, it is now a question of agreeing on the concept of self-centered development; of equipment for the development of rural communities and of food self-sufficiency; of the development of natural resources; and the integration of all available activity and facilities.

Sheikh Hamidou Kane, minister of plan and cooperation, who on this occasion also represented the minister of economy and finance, expressed "satisfaction over this contribution to such a high priority area as our economic development."

5170

CSO: 3419/891

RETROSPECTIVE LOOK AT 12 MONTHS SINCE 1982 ELECTIONS

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3431, 16 May 83 pp 1162-1163

[Article by Eddie Momoh]

[Text] GENERAL elections are rare events in many developing countries. This is because in a game of winner-take-all, the opposition has either been knocked under and banned or because many leaders have appointed themselves life presidents and so have come to regard elections as democratic luxuries.

Exactly 12 months ago, Sierra Leone held its first general elections since 1978, when the country moved into a one party. It was an occasion for reckless violence in several parts of the country, abuse, venomous accusation, counter-claims and mud-slinging. But nonetheless, the event attracted an unprecedented number of candidates who wanted "by all means" to enter the 105-member parliament. Ambassadors hurriedly resigned their offices while scores of other public servants unceremoniously vacated their posts to join in the apparent confusion of getting into Parliament. Even so, if many Sierra Leoneans were pleased with the stream of so-called politico-intellectuals who were rushed into Parliament in 1977, this time, many were shocked and surprised with the large number of people who wanted to leave their professions for politics. "You can't blame them, can you?" asked a knowledgeable Sierra Leonean civil servant. He went on to supply the answer: "This is the only way to get along these days in the country."

Like most one-party situations, the election was a non-issue event; rather the opprobrium was who could pay the highest premium to get the backing of the ruling party by being crowned with the party symbol at the all-powerful selection com-

mittee. Here bribes were said to have freely exchanged hands, while the committee insisted that anyone who wanted to be selected should have paid their party arrears up to date. It was a big money-making event by all accounts.

The cabinet which emerged in this still inconclusive election included at least 52 ministers and their deputies, a disappointment in international financial circles, as well as to Sierra Leoneans, who had hoped that the elections would bring economic lessons to a nation which had a few months earlier been hit by the worst financial scandal in its history, the "voucher-gate" rip-off.

But government officials continue to scoff at such criticism of an enlarged cabinet whose members make up half of the whole Parliament. They say for the sake of political sobriety and uniformity, it was in the interest of the nation to be widely represented in cabinet. Few people have been impressed with this argument.

However, the government has brought together men and women of great divergent views, however restrained, with a handful still largely committed to rescuing the country from economic isolation. Top of this list is Finance Minister, Salia Jusu-Sheriff, a former die-hard SLPP leader. Mr. Jusu-Sheriff or "Mr. Clean" as he is more affectionately known by his admirers, is a methodical man, an academic who has over the months, combined professional shrewdness with bureaucratic finesse to bring Sierra Leone to the attention of international financiers such as the IMF, the Islamic Development Bank and the World Bank. His style has allowed him to

work more effectively as a problem-solver in a government riddled in the past with economic waywardness and corruption, as evidenced by testimonies at the various commissions which are still probing the "voucher-gate" mess (*West Africa*, April 4, 1983).

For some years the state has been overspending and has run up a variety of debts, not least to the banking system which has led to inflation and a restriction of credit to the productive sectors. The consequent shortages and administrative restrictions have provoked a great deal of improper activity, as also evidenced by the discovery before the elections of substantial apparent frauds. The President was able to persuade Mr. Jusu-Sheriff to become Minister of Finance to try to resolve the nation's financial chaos. One of his first responses was to introduce a "budget" which met the constitutional requirements but did not actually entail any new provisions. By the time that he returned to Parliament with "amendments" incorporating actual changes, Mr. Jusu-Sheriff had made a big reduction in projected government spending compared with the estimates which had been awaiting him when he took office and also laid down guidelines for a system which should curb overspending.

Having established that the government was actually trying to do something practical about the state of its finances — and Mr. Jusu Sheriff has emphasised that he has been given the full support of the party leaders in applying his tough measures — the minister was able to approach the International Monetary Fund with some confidence. He had an understanding and encouraging reception.

Shortly afterwards he introduced a two-tier foreign exchange system, which can be seen as a devaluation for less essential imports, and is intended to make for a more thoughtful use of money. It is still a little early to say just how effective the scheme has been in practice, though there is little doubt that the current foreign exchange position is much healthier today.

The IMF is watching progress with attention since Sierra Leone is still in need of its assistance — and a lot more outside finance as well. The country's prospects are undoubtedly better than they were a year ago but faster movement in the right direction is still needed, which will demand continuing political support as well as further financial measures. Diamond and gold smuggling are still on the increase with government officials and Lebanese sometimes jockeying to take the first avail-

able flight to Europe. Dutch and Swiss documents show that, apart from the fact that these sales are never reflected in the country's revenue, the activities are also encouraged from high quarters.

Those who have been quick to commend Mr. Jusu-Sheriff for his economic ideas, say he is the best thing that has happened to Sierra Leone since 1978. But his critics say his economic policies seem as stymied as ever and there is a growing body of thought that he may be too quiet, that he may not be forceful enough to push through some of his programmes which have in the past been at the mercy of too many yes-men. Twelve months after the election, it is no surprise that the emphasis is still heavily on the economy, a dream of an economic betterment still cherished by Sierra Leoneans.

Another area which has featured since the election is agriculture. Produce prices in respect of the country's agriculture exports have been increased as an incentive to farmers to sell to the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPMB) while the government has signed with the US, agreements for American aids in developing fisheries and agriculture. Under the agreement for the provision of Le267,000 in support of inland fisheries, a two-year package has been worked out for the establishment of low-cost technology in fisheries as a viable and acceptable component of local farming systems in Sierra Leone. The fund, it is hoped, will assist government in developing its inland fisheries project and expand its farm fish activities in at least ten rural communities. The second agreement provides a total of Le1.6m. towards the Adaptation Crop Research and Extension (ACRE) project.

In the area of mining, prices of gold went up, diamond down while the Marampa Iron Ore Mines were activated. 70,000 tons of ore valued at US\$800,000 have already been exported to the steel plants of Voest, in Austria.

Nonetheless, it can be argued that Sierra Leone's foreign policies over the year, became as incomprehensible as they were inconsistent. The failure to explain its apparent change of mind on the Western Sahara issue, the non-presence of a Sierra Leone delegation at the first attempt to hold the OAU summit in Tripoli in August even though President Siaka Stevens had already written to various heads of state to announce Dr. Abdulai Conteh as his choice for the next secretary-general of the OAU, all add up to a confusion in which the country's foreign policy is yet to be clearly defined.

NRP REJECTS CLAIMS OF ITS DISINTEGRATION

No Longer Political Factor

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 14 May 83 p 6

[Editorial]

[Text] **WHAT HAPPENS** to the mainly English-speaking Opposition parties in the light of the by-election results?

The New Republic Party is no longer a political factor in the Transvaal.

It has no Transvaal MP. It managed only 312 votes in Waterkloof and 723 votes in Carletonville. The days when it could rely on 2 000 to 4 000 votes in a constituency, particularly on the platteland, are over.

The Bloedsappe are dying out. Those who remain have no party close to their hearts.

The NP was always the enemy. The PFP was too liberal and consists of Progs and former UP Young Turks who helped to destroy the UP.

With the NP having taken over part of the old UP policy, there may be some former UP supporters who will forgive and forget and vote Nationalist.

Similarly, there may be some who, like the Young Turks of Sir De Villiers Graaff's day, have become imbued with a more liberal spirit.

But most will probably now vote for the Conservative Party — and may have done so already in the by-elections — rather than vote NP or PFP.

The NRP is now almost completely a Natal party, being in control of that province. But with the NRP accepting the Government's reform plan, with some reservations, and generally speaking more and more like pseudo-Nationalists, the prospect of some NRP's crossing the floor is strong.

In any case, under attack by both the NP and the PFP, the odds on a weak NRP maintain-

ing its dominance in Natal are poor.

The NRP, to put it bluntly, has had it. Most of its MPs and MPCs will cross one day to the NP. But even if they do not, any setback in Natal will signal the end of the party.

One may wonder whether the PFP, with the NRP no longer a strong factor in the politics of English-speakers, will gain ground.

Perhaps the PFP may win two or three more seats in Natal from the NRP, but on the other hand, it will find that more and more of its supporters, like its business backers, are so keen on reform that backing the NP instead of the PFP is the in-thing.

The PFP may then lose two or three seats, which would counter-balance the seats it gains.

What is clear from the by-elections is that the PFP cannot go into platteland seats like Soutpansberg and Waterberg, or mining constituencies like Carletonville, with any chance of doing well; therefore, it keeps out of them.

In Waterkloof, an upper middle class urban seat that should have been a fair test of PFP progress, the PFP only increased its vote by 80.

The PFP, one can safely say, will be confined mainly to the constituencies of wealth it represents already.

We have no doubt that the Prime Minister will manoeuvre the PFP into a corner over the reform Bill and the referendum.

The Bill as it stands is rejected by the PFP. We cannot see the Prime Minister making any radical changes to the measure, since he has already indicated that the principles are unalterable.

Will the PFP accept the Bill as it finally emerges from the Parliamentary debate and select committee investigation?

We doubt it.

Will the PFP then call on its voters to say "No" in the referendum and risk having itself labelled as a party that is negative towards change and one that always thinks Black?

With a boycott image already, the party's quandary is extreme.

In any event, even if the PFP does suggest a

"no" vote, there may be many of its members who will vote "yes" because they long for change and see the plan as a first instalment.

The PFP, unlike the NRP, will continue to exist, but it will not hold the balance between the NP and the Right, but will remain as politically ineffectual as it has always been.

The real battle is now between the NP and the Afrikaner Right.

Claim Rejected

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 14 May 83 p 8

[Article by Tim Clarke]

[Text]

DURBAN. — Mr Ron Miller, the MP for Durban North and the leader of the New Republic Party in Natal, yesterday totally rejected claims that the NRP was about to disintegrate after its poor showing in the recent by-elections and that several of the party's MPs were making overtures to join the National Party.

Speaking from Cape Town, Mr Miller said: "We had a head committee meeting of the party in Durban only about a week ago. There was a 100 percent turnout. Is this a party which is about to disintegrate?"

Mr Miller also emphatically denied that there were MPs that were considering joining the National Party. "We meet in caucus every day and I would have known about it if any of the MPs were considering joining the National Party." He admitted that the performance of the Party in the two Transvaal by-election constituencies had been poor (the Party lost

its deposit in both constituencies) and said it was obvious that the machinery in the Transvaal would need improving.

"However, we are still very strong in Natal, our power base. Natal, unlike any other province, is still under the control of the NRP."

Mr Miller said that the party firmly believed, as was endorsed at the head executive meeting, that it had a major role to play in the South African political scene.

Dissension

Mr Frank Martin, the veteran MEC of the party in the province, also discounted reports yesterday that some MPC's were keen to join the National Party. He said that there had been no dissension at the head committee meeting of the party in Durban. The NRP was still playing a major roll in the political spectrum.

Mr Hennie Brink, the secretary of the party in Natal, said yesterday "some newspapers always try to write us off after we fare badly in elections. But the party is as strong as ever in Natal and cannot be written off."

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 18 May 83 p 6

[Editorial]

[Text] POOR New Republic Party. When it should be fighting the Government, it agrees with it. When it should be projecting the image of an Opposition party of strong principles, it is accommodating. Not that everyone should oppose the Constitution Bill just because it is put forward by the Government. Not that everyone should oppose the Bill just because it is a plan which quite a few academics and commentators find unsatisfactory as it stands, and some of its features objectionable. But an Opposition party must oppose. It must say forthrightly what it considers wrong with a measure. It must withhold its support while it fights for the changes it considers necessary. Alas, the NRP is a pale shadow of what it once was. It has lost its position in South African politics. It no longer pretends to be an alternative to the PFP as the Official Opposition, never mind an alternative government. It has no parliamentary representation in the Transvaal, or the Free State. It has one seat in the Cape and seven in Natal. Its MPCs control Natal, but it is doubtful whether they will do so if provincial councils remain in being under the new dispensation. Its image is that of a loser, of a party on its way out. Indeed, it will cease to exist when some of its MPs and MPCs cross the floor, as they are certain to do in the not too distant future. We suppose some life could have been put into the NRP if it had a dynamic leadership, a policy that could appeal to moderate voters, an image of a true fighting force. But it is not the case. And so, when a Constitution Bill is put forward by the Government that makes the most far-reaching changes in the constitution since Union in 1910 (yes, even more far-reaching than the decision to turn the country into a republic), the NRP makes no attempt to contest the measure with vigour, in the hope, even if it is a forlorn one, that the

Government will make the changes the party deems essential.

Its leader, Mr Vause Raw, meekly says the party has decided overwhelmingly in its federal council "that we will not oppose the Bill in principle, or support the amendments of the unholy alliance of the PFP and the CP."

Another reason for the NRP standpoint was that a rejection of the Bill was a vote for the status quo of White domination and exclusive White political power.

"We have decided to accept it as a starting point for change . . . I want to make it clear to the noisy yappers on my political Left (referring to the PFP) that this does not imply support of the Government itself or of NP policy in general, but solely of the Bill's constitutional framework as a starting point for reform in South Africa."

The trouble, of course, is that if you project something as a pale imitation of the real thing, people will prefer the real thing.

And that is what is happening with the NP and the NRP.

The NP is the real thing, the NRP the pale imitation.

Mr Nigel Woods, former MP for Berea, who has been active in the NRP and its predecessor, the UP, for 22 years, has resigned because of the party's favourable attitude to the Bill.

He is also saddened "by the steady drift of the NRP leadership towards the Nationalist camp."

If the party continued to lose its identity, as it is now doing, it would have no grounds for contesting another election as a separate party.

Our own feeling is that the NRP is a played-out party and the sooner its members cross the floor, to the NP (perhaps one or two may choose the PFP) the better.

They are heading in that direction anyway, so why not take the step when they can do it of their own volition, instead of having to move across when the party is finally on its last legs?

Fence-Sitters Hit

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 21 May 83 p 10

[Article by Tim Clarke]

[Text]

DURBAN. — The row within the New Republic Party in Natal continues to simmer with a statement yesterday by Mr Andrew Martin that NRP public representatives should stop "fence sitting" and decide on which side of the House of Assembly they wished to sit.

Mr Martin, who was the former chairman of the Howick Youth Branch of the NRP, was expelled from the party earlier this week together with Mr Dave McNaught by the national leader, Mr Vause Raw, for making statements condemning the NRP stance on the new constitutional Bill.

Mr Martin said that NRP MPs and MPCs who fought the 1981 elec-

tions on NRP principals should seriously consider resigning and fighting by-elections since they had betrayed party principles.

Principles

Mr Martin claimed that the new constitutional Bill should be rejected by NRP members because of the lack of Black participation.

He rejected a statement by Mr Frank Martin, senior NRP MEC in the Natal Provincial Council, that differences within the party concern tactics and not principles.

"It is obvious that Black participation and the rejection of group domination are the most important principles in South African politics."

CSO: 3400/1466

MUSLIMS UP IN ARMS OVER VISA BAN TO SAUDI ARABIA

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 18 May 83 p 13

[Text]

DURBAN. — The South African Moslem community is up in arms over the sudden decision by the Saudi-Arabia government to ban the issue of visas at its international Jeddah airport.

The decision was made this month and has come as a "terrible" blow to the tens of thousands of South African Moslems who make an annual pilgrimage either to Mecca or Medina.

Mr Sheik Ibrahim, manager of the Durban based ETC Travel, who has organised the pilgrimages over the past few years, said yesterday that the Saudi Arabian government had given no reason for the sudden ban on visas. He said it was a long established practice for the Moslem community in the Republic to obtain visas at the airport.

South Africa and Saudi Arabia had no diplomatic relations because of the Republic's race policies and it was normal practice for Moslems to travel to Jeddah and obtain the visas there.

Mr Ibrahim said with-

out warning arrangements had suddenly changed.

The plight of the Moslem community was highlighted when a group of Moslems from Cape Town arrived at Jeddah recently and were told that visas would not be issued and returned to South Africa without completing the pilgrimage.

Mr Ibrahim left for Jeddah yesterday where he plans to meet senior Saudi Arabian government officials in an effort to have the blanket ban lifted.

The Islamic Council of South Africa is also making representations to the Saudi Arabian authorities to bring to their attention, the hardship the ban was causing among Moslems.

Mr Ibrahim said that the council in South Africa was planning to arrange a meeting with Islamic council leaders in Cairo, Egypt, to ask them to use their influence with Saudi Arabia to lift the ban.

REFORM BILL SPLITS INDIAN COMMUNITY

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 21 May 83 p 13

[Article by Tim Clarke]

[Text]

DURBAN. — The serious divisions in the Indian community, reflected in their attitude towards the new Reform Bill, was highlighted yesterday in a statement by a leading Durban Moslem, Mr Mohammed Suleman.

Mr Suleman said that it would be "a colossal blunder" for the Moslem community, as a minority group, to reject the Reform Bill.

The statement comes on the eve of two important Indian party congresses which are to be held at Durban and on the North Coast at the weekend, where full attention will be given to the constitutional proposals.

The National Peoples Party, the ruling group in the South African Indian Council, (SAIC) will hold a congress at a Durban hotel and the Reform Party will meet at Stanger, North Coast.

Mr Suleman, who is a leading businessman in Durban, said he rejected the call by the Islamic Council of South Africa to Moslems not to par-

ticipate in the new constitutional dispensation.

Mr Suleman said he attended the meeting of the council in Durban this week and made it very plain that he was opposed to the council directing the Moslem community as a whole, to reject the plan. The council issued a statement rejecting the plans because they "retained the traditional order of apartheid" and also excluded Blacks.

Mr Suleman pointed out that the Moslem group was a small part of the Indian community as a whole, but was powerful in that it occupied a significant place in the commercial life of the community.

He said that if the Indian community as a whole, decided to accept the Reform Bill, the Moslem community could be out on a limb because of the Islamic Council.

He said there were signs that the SAIC would accept the proposals and it would be a distinct disadvantage for the Moslem community to be singled

out as being unco-operative.

So far, Mr Raj Bansi, the leader of the National Peoples Party and chairman of the executive SAIC, has not committed himself fully on the new Bill. It is known that he is under considerable pressure both from his left and his right. Many SAIC members want to work with the Government, but on the other hand there are influential Indian leaders who are closely associated with Chief Ghat-sa Buthelezi, the head of the KwaZulu nation, who has totally rejected the Bill.

Mr Raj Bansi has repeatedly stated that the way out of the dilemma is to hold a referendum to fully test their feelings, but there are those SAIC members on the right who are becoming impatient with this attitude.

The Reform Party, which is closely associated with Chief Buthelezi, is almost certain to reject the Bill outright on Sunday.

OUTLOOK FOR PLATINUM PRODUCERS 'BLEAK'

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 20 May 83 p 22

[Text]

SOUTH African platinum producers will find it very difficult to expand output from the present level before 1985, say stockbrokers Davis, Borkum Hare.

In a publication "Platinum — a view from South Africa", the brokers estimate the weight of stocks in the hands of investors, producers and consumers at a very large 1 500 000 ounces. The short-term outlook is bleak despite a gradual improvement in the world economic situation.

It estimates current South African producers and consumers at a very large 1 500 000 ounces. The short-term outlook is bleak despite a gradual improvement in the world economic situation.

It estimates current South African production at 1 550 000 ounces a year, nearly a third below the 2 250 000 ounces produced in 1980.

The company's mining researcher, David Gleason, said, however, that a note of caution had to be sounded. If gold follows a sustained and steady rise, investment demand for

platinum and other precious metals will also increase.

"This could result ... in the overhang on the platinum market disappearing into investors' hands over a relatively short time span. Such a scenario would radically affect the view taken of platinum's forward prospects."

In a separate article, chief economist Mike Brown said he expects the current economic upswing will lead to the establishment of platinum's price premium above gold — as has happened recently on the free markets.

"... As in the late seventies, when platinum sometimes traded at between \$250 and 350 above the gold price, we would expect this premium to widen substantially during periods of active speculation in precious metals," Brown said.

Looking at the possibility in five years of the advent of a new South African mine, currently being prospected by a consortium led by Gold Fields of South Africa Ltd, Gleason said: "The stage is set for a struggle of titanic

proportions between three of the world's leading mining houses."

He said the market offers far less promise to the new producer than was the case a decade ago, being more complex sophisticated and unpredictable, and less accessible.

Gleason said the market is fraught with uncertainty. The European car market offers promise if lead is removed from petrol, as has been proposed recently by the UK.

But he cautioned that other promising growth areas, such as fuel cells and non-Japanese jewellery have failed to realise optimistic expectations in the past.

On the supply side, account must be taken of the prospect of large amounts derived from scrapped catalytic converters. These could reach 100 000 ounces a year.

On marketing, Gleason said the scope for securing long-term contracts has diminished, while the producer price system has waned in authority and is unlikely to make a comeback.

ASSOCOM SEEKS TO REGISTER UNIONS

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 20 May 83 p 2

[Text]

THE Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa (Assocom) believes that the registration of all trade unions in the country should in "due course" be made compulsory.

At a press conference following the organisation's mid-year Executive Council meeting in Johannesburg yesterday, Assocom's manpower secretary Mr G A V Brett, said registration should be subject to the provision by unions of membership records, lists of office bearers and audited books of accounts.

He said the registration of all trade unions and employers should in time be made compulsory, and that the Registrar should have no discretion to refuse registration provided unions furnished the necessary documentation and records for the procedure.

Mr Brett said Assocom's Executive Council believed that full publication of registrations should be made in the Government Gazette so that all interested parties could be informed of unions and employer associations active in the country.

Necessary

"We feel compulsory registration is necessary for associations to have some form of caucus so that if legal action involving them has to be taken, say after a strike, we know what we are dealing with.

"We want to deal with men of substance in trade unions — the sort who face up to their responsibilities."

He said Assocom was aware of a tendency to move away from viewing registration as a criterion in South African labour relations, but added that his organisation believed this would change in time.

"If the fears of unions that registration is a means of controlling them are allayed and shown to be without foundation, the idea of compulsory registration may gradually come to be accepted. What we need is a little education in this field."

'Qualitative'

Assocom's policy on recognition of trade unions has also been finalised by the Executive Council, an important aspect being the view that "qualitative" unions with a fairly small membership should not be squeezed out of recognition agreements by larger, more broadly-based unions.

"We think any employer would be foolish not to recognise major unions, but at the same time we see scope for the additional recognition of smaller unions where membership is of high quality," said Mr Brett.

Assocom also believed that the decision of any employer to recognise or not to recognise a union should be a voluntary act, free of state interference, he said. The issue of registration should not, at this stage, be relevant.

Closed Shop

As for closed shop agreements between employers and unions, Assocom was against this concept and believed in freedom of association or disassociation.

Other points of policy finalised at the council meeting were

- That Industrial Councils and Works Committees were no longer adequate — by themselves — in a meeting the needs of all concerned with the industrial relations system in South Africa. All affected parties should therefore participate in the formulation of any new system of collective bargaining, with any new legal framework

allowing for maximum flexibility in its use by the parties.

- In multi-union situations, the negotiations of wages should take place within a single forum.

- Employers and employees should be encouraged to settle disputes without resorting to the use of forces on either side. Legislation for the setting up of bargaining structures should be flexible.

CSO: 3400/1466

ADDITIONAL 15 YEARS GIVEN THREE SILVERTON TERRORISTS

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 21 May 83 p 11

[Text]

THE three men involved in the Silverton trial, presently serving a sentence of life imprisonment, were yesterday jailed for an additional 15 years by the Pretoria Supreme Court.

Ncimithi Johnson Lubisi, Petrus Tspo Mashigo and Naphtali Manana were sentenced to death on November 26, 1980 for high treason following an attack on the Soekmekaar police station on January 4, 1980.

On June 3 last year, their death sentences were commuted.

Wearing regulation blue prison jackets and

leg irons the men entered the dock yesterday where they were sentenced to death over two years ago. They smiled, waved and shouted greetings to their families sitting in the public gallery.

Mr Justice J De Villiers sentenced the men to 10 years imprisonment on two charges of attempted murder and five years on a charge of robbery with aggravating circumstances.

Arguing in mitigation, defence counsel, Mr C R

Mailer, said: "The accused have been detained, since their sentencing, in the shadow of the valley of death for about 19 months. They were detained in isolation, kept in a single cell and allowed out for about ten minutes exercise daily.

"They suffered extensive psychological agony as they heard fellow prisoners marched manacled to their deaths. The effect of this was devastating".

Passing sentence, Mr Justice De Villiers said that although it was purely academic, as the men would spend the rest of their natural lives in prison, he viewed these crimes in isolation from the charge of high treason.

The men were convicted of robbing a school teacher of his bakkie at gunpoint. The bakkie was later used in an attack on the Soekmekaar police station.

The police station was raked with gunfire and handgrenade explosions. One policeman was slightly injured in the attack. — Sapa.

NATIONAL SERVICE DRAFTEES RELIEVED OF BORDER DUTY OBLIGATION

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 20 May 83 p 1

[Article by Jaap Theron]

[Text]

CAPE TOWN. — All national service draftees who were first called up in 1973 or earlier have been relieved of their obligation to do three months' border duty every year.

Instead they have been transferred to the Citizen Force where they will have to do a mere 12 days annually.

This was announced by the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, during yesterday's debate on his Budget in Parliament.

It had become necessary, he said, to make this change to the national service regulations to prevent unfair treatment to those who had been called up in 1973 and before. It was in 1973 that the new longer service periods were introduced.

The next big step towards the formation of South Africa's own "Dads Army" to protect strategic installations in time of emergency was also announced yesterday.

Gen Malan's announcement covers the towns of Nelspruit, Carolina and Piet Retief, and is seen as the start to the military activation of more middle-aged men in other towns.

While full details of the quantity of men to be trained and directed to the commandos are not available for security reasons, the move to compulsorily register all men between the ages of 18 and 54 who have not done military service will eventually affect many thousands.

Further details of the plan were not available officially in Cape Town last night.

It is understood that initially the call-up pattern will be extended over a period to other towns bordering on foreign Black states and also to those where there are strategic installations.

The selection of the three towns specified by Gen Malan is seen as particularly important as Nelspruit virtually borders on Mozambique. Intelligence feedback from Maputo indicates an increasing breakdown of law and order there and a growing potential threat to South Africa. Carolina and Piet Retief are key towns close to Swaziland's borders.

Actual call-up figures envisaged, and the towns to be affected are already decided. They make up a relatively small percentage above the full potential call-up figure of the men concerned.

CSO: 3400/1466

NATIONAL SERVICE VETERANS GET 'REPRIEVE'

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 21 May 83 p 10

[Article by Keith Abendroth]

[Text]

CAPE TOWN. — A Defence spokesman yesterday promised "reprieved" former National Servicemen and potential "Dad's Army" conscripts that they would not be called up — "unless absolutely necessary".

The Defence Force, he said, firmly underwrote and backed the principle of Defence Minister Magnus Malan that the optimum use of the country's manpower was a prime economic strategic target.

The "reprieve" puts an end to uncertainty among large numbers of National Service veterans of intakes prior to 1973 about camp service periods "owed" by them but not served for various reasons.

Bonus

The Defence spokesman said that these men would not go onto the active Citizen Force Reserve for a five-year breathing space — theoretically subject to a maximum call-up of not more than 90 days in a two-year period.

An added bonus was that even if they were not

called up, or served only a few days during a cycle, they would be "credited" with the full 90 days.

In terms of the overall service plan, ACF Reserve men, after their five-years there, were seconded to commandos — with a basis of 12 days of service a year — until they reached the age of 55.

Concessions

In an effort to achieve maximum labour utilisation across the whole spectrum of the country's economy, concessions were granted in cases such as farmers, one-man businesses or key personnel for them to do their service in their home area.

The "Dad's Army" project is expected in parliamentary circles to be rapidly extended initially to towns on or near South Africa's long borders. Particularly those with what are seen as potential troublesome neighbours — Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho.

No matter how overtly reasonably sound, the present diplomatic relationships appear to be,

priority towns will be those along the Mozambique and Zimbabwe areas from which intelligence feedback indicates a growing potential threat and in which countries a social breakdown is rocketing.

Premise

Uncertainty over relationships with Lesotho and Swaziland will see a mobilisation of the local security forces in towns along these borders.

Defence Force spokesmen stress that there is no intention to use these units for operational area

duty. The basic premise is home defence and greater release of younger and more highly militarily-trained men for these duties.

In a short time the system is expected to be extended to industrialised areas where the threat of subversion is greatest.

It is understood that a bonus envisioned in the scheme is an effective "intelligence" service, with men bred and living in their areas giving feedback and indications of possible terrorist infiltration points, to Military Intelligence.

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ESCOM'S ACCUMULATED DEFICIT REPORTED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 18 May 83 p 20

[Text]

ESCOM'S accumulated deficit reached R154-million, according to the 1982 annual report just released in Johannesburg.

Electricity sales for 1982 grew by 2,4 percent compared with 1981. This increase reflects many of the recessionary conditions at home and abroad.

Chairman Jan Smith says in the report that this figure should be viewed in terms of the average annual growth rate of 8,6 percent in Escom sales over the past 30 years.

During 1982 there was a decline in electricity sales to the industrial category and the railways, while the average annual growth rate of the mining sector was also lower.

"The unexpected decline in electricity sales and the major cost increases, which may be attributed largely to the high rate of inflation, resulted in a deficit of R58-million for the year," the report says.

"The accumulated deficit of R154-million will, however, have to be recovered.

"Escom's major cost components are coal and

interest. In 1982 coal costs increased by an average of 21 percent as compared to the previous year.

"Escom's decreased demand for coal resulted in increased prices a ton delivered, and Escom was therefore compelled to pay relatively more for its coal.

"Interest charged to the supply account increased by 16,8 percent on an average cents a kw hour sold basis.

"Net expenditure on fixed assets amounted to R2 741-million in 1982. External finance from local and foreign financial markets covered Escom's financial commitments, but at a considerably increased cost.

"Escom's biggest total cost increase arose due to high interest rates. Interest and finance charges increased by R406-million or 45,1 percent more than 1981.

"Escom has endeavoured since the Seventies to increase the level of internal financing to enable it to use either internal or external financing at any given stage — wherever the lower interest rate applies.

BRIEFS

AGULHAS BANK STUDIED--CAPE TOWN--The National Research Institute for Oceanology of the CSIR is to enter into a new research project to study the dynamics of the Agulhas Bank because of its value to the fishing industry and its potential as a source of oil and gas, according to the council's report for 1982. The report says the coastal region is vulnerable to pollution from both land and sea, including spillage from passing oil tankers. The council has also launched a Benguela ecology programme in order to obtain information on the structure and functioning of the ecosystem in the West Coast area. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 20 May 83 p 12]

HIGH TREASON SENTENCE--PIETERMARITZBURG--A 21-year-old man, Khaya Skweyiya, was sentenced in the Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court yesterday to 17 years' imprisonment for high treason and assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. He was acquitted on a charge of murdering a policeman. Skweyiya admitted he had been sent to South Africa by the African National Congress on a mission to blow up the Mahlabatini fuel pumping station last year. After abandoning the mission, his co-conspirator, Lucky Ntsele, and a policeman were killed in a shoot-out. Mr Justice Nienaber considered the main charge of high treason particularly grave and said Skweyiya had supported the methods and aims of the ANC. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 20 May 83 p 11]

DEFENSE COST EFFECTIVENESS--THE Institute for Maritime Technology, a highly classified security organisation at Simonstown, near Cape Town, is showing how to maximise the value of every Rand of the Defence Budget. The institute disclosed some of its operations this week to military correspondents, and, according to a spokesman, the two main objectives of the institute are; firstly, to define the optimum mix of weapon systems for missions to be performed; and secondly, to use these systems and the equipment efficiently under local conditions. To achieve these objectives, the institute must: --analyse and evaluate the performance of weapon systems; --study the physical characteristics of the difficult maritime environment in which the systems and platforms were to operate; --study and initiate the development of promising new technologies to assess their potential; --build models of new systems to estimate their performance; --mathematical simulation of systems to optimise performance parameters without expensive and time consuming trials; --perform a cost effectiveness study of alternative weapon systems. The second objective, the spokesman said, again required extensive performance measurement, analysis, evaluation and mathematical modelling, or war gaming to devise efficient tactics and doctrine for the operational use of existing equipment to counter the present threat. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 20 May 83 p 15]

VIOLENCE NEAR DURBAN--UNREST and violence flared up in the Lamontville township to the south of Durban again this week. The police said yesterday that about 11.30 pm on Wednesday the mob set alight a vehicle belonging to the Port Natal Administration Board. They also smashed the windows of a building belonging to the Board and attempted to set it alight. When the police arrived the mob dispersed. At this stage it is believed that the group responsible for the unrest could have come from the Chesterville township where there has also been agitation against the Port Natal Administration Board in the past few weeks. This was the first outbreak of violence in the Lamontville township since the Minister of Cooperation and Development, Dr Piet Koornhof, held talks with the Mayor of Durban and Board officials in Durban about the proposed 63 percent hike in rents. After a lengthy meeting Dr Koornhof announced that the rents would not be enforced until late in August and also voted various monies from his Department to improve and repair houses in the township. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 20 May 83 p 5]

BEACH APARTHEID--DURBAN--Mrs Joan du Plooy, the Mayor of Kingsburgh on the Natal South Coast, is "totally fed up" with the attitude of the New Republic Party (NRP) MP for the area, Mr George Bartlett, and the NRP-MPC for the area, Mr Ray Haslam, over the attitude towards the council's attempts to keep beaches in the area exclusively for the use of Whites. She told The Citizen on Wednesday night, after a meeting in the borough addressed by Mr Frank le Roux, the Conservative Party MP for Brakpan, that she and the council had lost all confidence in Mr Bartlett and Mr Haslam. She claimed that they had done little or nothing to help the council in its fight to keep local beaches White. She said that Mr Le Roux had promised to take up the council's fight. Earlier last month the council called on both Mr Bartlett and Mr Haslam, to resign their seats and fight by-elections on the beach issue. Later both Mr Bartlett and Mr Haslam said they had no intention of doing so and Mr Bartlett in particular distanced himself totally from the action of the council in asking the beaches to remain for the exclusive use for Whites. The council called on the two men to resign after White rate-payers in the borough voted almost unanimously in a referendum for the beaches to be zoned exclusively for Whites. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 20 May 83 p 5]

CONSOLIDATION PROPOSALS EXCLUDE ZEERUST--IT appeared that the town of Zeerust would not be affected by consolidation proposals for the Republic and Bophuthatswana, the Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr Piet Koornhof, said yesterday. He was replying to a question from Mr B H Wilkens (NP Ventersdorp) who had asked whether the common border between the two states had been determined. "The borders might be affected by the consolidation proposals of the Commission for Co-operation and Development." Mr Wilkens had asked if the town of Zeerust was the subject of negotiations. "Indications are that the town will not be affected by the commission's proposals," Dr. Koornhof said. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 14 May 83 p 6]

CSO: 3400/1466

NEW ENVOY TO BRUSSELS DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH BELGIUM

Brussels LE SOIR in French 18 Apr 83 p 3

[Article by E. Ux.: "Mr Bomboko to the Belgians: 'Come to Zaire as Friends, But Don't Come as Proconsuls'"]

[Text] Mr Bomboko Lokumba Is 'Elenge, the new ambassador from Zaire, gave his first speech since his arrival at his post in Brussels, before the Belgo-African Chamber of Commerce, chaired by Mr Michel Relecom.

The diplomat first of all defined the role which will be his during his mandate. Stressing that he has very many friends in Belgium, and recalling that he has always defended the Belgians working in Zaire, he stated that this would not have any influence on his mission, which consists first of all in defending and safeguarding the legitimate interests of his country and of its nationals.

Next, in order to dispel "a few misunderstandings and a few ambiguities," the ambassador listed what he calls the five trump cards of Zaire, specifically: its political stability, the cultural liberation of the people, the vastness of his country's natural and economic riches, its links in Africa and in the world, and finally Zaire's desire to cooperate with Belgium.

Looking more closely at the last point, Mr Bomboko believes that "all the obstacles which have arisen on our common road are of an emotional and subjective nature."

As proof of harmony between the two countries, the ambassador cited the relations based on mutual high esteem between the king and President Mobutu.

There is also obvious regard between the political leaders of Zaire and your political world, specified the speaker, and a few representatives demanding that Belgium send a parliamentary committee of inquiry to Zaire will not be able to change anything at all in the situation. As far as Mr Bomboko is concerned, there is no problem in relations with economic and financial circles either. Everywhere there is warm friendship, he said. Paradoxically, every time there are conflicts or threats of a split between us, they are to be found at the level of public opinion. The Zairians have no problems in their feelings toward the Belgians; the latter still too often harbor resentment and

prejudice toward us. Taking the press to task, Mr Bomboko asked that it be more respectful toward the Zairians.

He also feels that Zaire is the most welcoming and most profitable partner of Belgium. But Zaire will reject any ambiguity and any haggling, as his predecessor, Mr Kengo Wa Dondo (today prime minister) stated before his departure.

Defining the rigorous policy instituted in Zaire, Mr Bomboko said that his government has no intention at all of returning to any form of Zairianization. Similarly, he accused Belgium of welcoming "corrupt individuals" under "vaguely humanitarian" pretexts.

Then followed a lengthy plea, studded with numerous figures on the economic situation of Zaire. He reached the conclusion that, after a difficult year in 1982, glimmers of hope have appeared for 1983 as Zaire is on the eve of two major negotiations: one with the Monetary Fund, the other with the World Bank.

Na Mputu

Getting back to relations with Belgium, Mr Bomboko noted that Mr Tindemans' report on Belgium's African policy is a parliamentary document for internal use, but that it has the merit of "taking cooperation between Belgium and Zaire out of its context of controversy and passion in which some people obstinately persist in keeping it. It reveals that the Belgian government rejects any neo-colonial or post-colonial reflexes."

In conclusion, Mr Bomboko -- not without humor -- recognized that for his compatriots Belgium is "Na Mputu," which means Europe, to the point that if a Zairian were to go to another European country without going through Belgium, nobody would believe that he had been in Europe.

As a matter of fact, and this would be the last word of this flowing speech, the Zairians use the term "Noko" -- which means "the uncles" -- to refer to the Belgians. In short, continued the ambassador, "you are our uncles, but never forget that your nephews have grown." "To our uncles, I say: 'Have confidence in us, invest in our country.' But I add immediately: 'Come as friends, but don't come as proconsuls. We appreciate visits of friendship, but we refuse committees of inquiry. Zaire is a welcoming country, do not consider it as a conquered country.'"

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CSO: 3419/892

ECONOMY DRIVE SLASHES ARMY BILL

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 21 May 83 p 13

[Text]

VICTORIA FALLS. — Zimbabwe Defence expenditure would be cut from just under 20 percent of the national budget to 10 percent, as the country's demobilisation programmes ended, says the Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, Dr Bernard Chidzero.

Answering questions at a Zimbabwe national Chambers of Commerce business forum, the Minister said government spending had been cut by almost R222 million in the current fiscal year.

To help boost exports, he said, loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund would enable the Government to relax credit terms, to make overseas sales more competitive.

Dr Chidzero said the performance of Zimbabwe's economy in 1982/83 would be "well below" targets laid down

in the three-year transitional development plan.

Imbalances

Estimates showed a significant drop in virtually all indicators.

Externally, large imbalances and strains had emerged, reflecting poor price and export performances, as the world recession had deepened with a slow inflow of funds and foreign investment.

Hopefully, lower interest rates would encourage investment and investors would be prepared to take risks.

"Imaginative investment is not deterred by political systems", he said, citing Western investment in the Soviet Union and China.

The strength of the Zimbabwe dollar and escalating domestic costs explained much of the poor earnings from exports in 1982.

Pledges

Dr Chidzero agreed that funds had been slow in coming in, but said that out of R2 000-million pledged, R777,8-m had been committed by last September. The figure had now risen to ZD1 billion (R1,1 billion) but the remainder was "difficult to utilise".

He said that while the Government had taken contingency measures to counteract the private sector's reluctance to invest through the expansion of public sector investment, "Government has been put in the unenviable position of having to cut this programme through the introduction of restraint measures aimed at maintaining the fiscal deficit within manageable proportions.

"Nevertheless, we are likely to see government's expenditure being concentrated more on capital development," he said.

ZIMBABWE

BRIEFS

MP FREED--HARARE--A leading member of Zimbabwe's Opposition Zapu Party said yesterday she had been freed after a week in detention. Mrs Thenijiwe Lesabe, a member of Parliament, confirmed her release, but declined to give details when contacted by telephone at her home in Bulawayo. Another Zapu MP, Mr Vote Moyo, has been held for almost a year in connection with an attack on Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe's resident last June. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 20 May 83 p 11]

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